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27 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gen. Cabell

SUBJECT : Long-Range Military Assistance Program
FY 1962-66

1. This first attempt at long-range MAP programming was generated in response to a Draper Committee recommendation. It marks a real step forward in this sense.

2. In essence, the program calls for MAP outlays of \$11 billion during the five years, FY 1962-66 (this should be contrasted with the \$25 billion which DOD estimates would be required to meet all of the JCS strategic objectives during the period, or the \$16 billion to which the Draper Committee shaved this figure).

3. This \$11 billion estimate assumes a maximum effort by the recipient countries, indeed one some 43% higher by 1966 than it was in 1959 (for a total \$93 billion allied plus US effort):

- a. About \$5 billion would go to NATO, and would be complemented by an expected 40% increase in European defense outlays to about \$18 billion annually by 1966.
- b. About \$3 billion to the Far East (Japan, Korea, GRC).
- c. The SEA segment would be \$635 million.
- d. \$640 million for Pakistan and Iran.
- e. Latin America gets \$400 million.

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f. About 5-10% of the \$11 billion total will go for bases, including NATO infra-structure.

g. An additional 5-10% would be allocated to precluding Communist influence in such areas as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, etc. (i.e. for MAP aid to countries where we do not have military objectives per se, but are using MAP for political reasons). It also includes some MAP for internal security purposes to Jordan, Lebanon, and Liberia.

4. Gordon Gray noted that the program really calls for a basic change in current MAP policy. We have been averaging only around \$1.5 billion annually over the last several years in new MAP appropriations, but the pipeline is running dry, so the new program calls for upping the ante to about \$2.2 billion annually.

5. The biggest increment of new funds is primarily for modernization, in the case of NATO, mostly for nuclear-capable weapons.


6. The report concludes that even with an \$11 billion program: (a) non-nuclear forces required for general war will still be quantitatively and qualitatively incapable of the strategic defensive contemplated; (b) limited war capabilities will still be inadequate in the Middle East and Far East. Worse still, anything less than the \$11 billion will make it impracticable to rely on Allied forces in implementation of current JCS strategy.

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7. While we are in no position to judge whether the aid magnitudes involved are reasonable or not, I would like to add my strong personal conviction that the program itself seems based on outmoded estimates of the likely enemy threat during FY 62-66. It is built essentially on the old JCS force objectives of several years ago, which have not really been adjusted to the many striking changes in the Soviet military threat which are now taking place. One obvious example - the MAP for NATO is based squarely on MC-70, which is currently being revised, and is also called seriously into question by the Bowie Report. As another example, the Soviets are switching increasingly to ballistic missiles for tactical as well as strategic use, and the IL-28 is rapidly disappearing. By 1962-66 this process will be very far along. Yet we are programming large numbers of HAWK and NIKE units for NATO Europe. By the time we get these installed they may be useless against the main threat. Thus at a time when the US is planning to move away from active air defense, we are still programming lots of it for our allies.

8. In other words, I feel there may be a serious cultural lag in MAP programming. My other examples would be much more speculative, but I for one would question the great emphasis on minesweepers, destroyers, etc. for NATO at a time when the Soviet naval threat is probably shifting from anti-shipping to sub-launched missile attack. I realize that this is not enough ammunition to justify your criticizing the whole plan at NSC, but I think I could sell you on raising a gentle eyebrow at some of the archaisms in it.



R. W. KOMER

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